A study by Brigid Gesami goes on to say there is no one recognized definition of the term “maritime security” in the literature (Bueger, 2014) . According to Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), the idea is not defined as such in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the first – and still the most important –international document recognizing the need for collaborative approaches to maritime security, which was adopted in 1982. Piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illegal trafficking by sea, i.e. drugs trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking, and human trafficking, global climate change, cargo theft, and so on, are all challenges to “Maritime Security.” These threats are always changing, and they may take the form of a hybrid: an interrelated and unpredictable combination of conventional and irregular warfare, terrorism, and/or organized crime.

The seas are more important in today’s economy, enabling all nations to participate in the global marketplace. More than 80% of the world’s commerce goes by water, establishing a worldwide maritime connection. Containers carry about half of the world’s commerce in terms of value, and 90 percent of general goods. Maritime security is best accomplished by combining worldwide public and private maritime security operations into a unified effort that tackles all maritime threats (NeuralGuard, 2021).

According to NeuralGuard (2021), to reap the advantages of globalization, several na- tions have invested heavily in maritime infrastructure, containerized commerce, energy sup- ply chains, information technology-driven freight movements, and procedures that accelerate monetary operations. The world is now in an unusual state, characterized by the illogical acts of forces that encourage terrorism as a way of separating the international community and undermining world stability in general.

Nonetheless, “sea power is essential to the globalization process in a manner that land power and air power are not, simply because the system is mostly dependent on sea trans- portation” (Till 2009). As a result, all trade countries have an interest in the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Safeguarding the national littorals and exclusive eco- nomic zones (EEZ) is a state responsibility while safeguarding the high seas is an international and transnational responsibility.

Africa’s Maritime Threats

To grasp the importance of maritime security in Africa, concerns relating to the risks that face the continent’s maritime domain must be addressed. These dangers have influenced the tactics that many governments have used and are using to address them. Knowledge of these dangers may also help uncover gaps in protection enforcement and trends in the development of threats and the introduction of new ones. The 2010 AU maritime security workshop added to the conversation on Africa’s maritime security by emphasizing the need of addressing this under-resourced security area. In the middle of the pirate frenzy, a bigger conversation about maritime hazards in African seas is taking form. The literature’s concentration remains on the Horn of Africa (Gulf of Aden) and the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of West Africa. Accord- ing to Chalk (2008), maritime terrorism off the coast of Africa is conceivable and is bolstered by lucrative targets at sea that offer opportunities for economic destabilization, government punishment for tolerating lax coastal and portside security, and access to commercial tech- nologies by perpetrators to operate at sea, all of which are fueled by primarily questionable governmental practices.

Dua (2019) observes that in recent years, the Gulf of Aden, particularly the seas off the coast of Somalia, has witnessed an extraordinary increase in maritime pirate occurrences. Be- cause of the geopolitical and economic significance of this region, various national, regional, and international military and legal solutions have been developed to address this issue. While maritime piracy is often seen as a seaborne manifestation of failing governments or crime, it has a more complicated connection with land- and sea-based governance. Piracy is best un- derstood as a practice of extraction and claim building on mobility that develops from deeper historical contexts and is connected to land-based economics and politics. It occurs mainly in politically fragmented but relatively stable areas.

The increase in maritime traffic, particularly via choke spots, has resulted in an increase in maritime piracy, as seen in Africa. Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, pressure for increased landward protection diverted resources away from maritime affairs, eroding the ability to maintain good order at sea. Africa already has an overabundance of land-based security concerns, and as a result, it is increasingly ignoring maritime issues. Official cooperation in maritime crimes, along with insufficient security measures in ports and coastal seas, serves to exacerbate the pirate menace. Unfortunately,

Africa suffers from a widespread lack of maritime governance (particularly law enforcement) that encourages piracy (Chalk, 2008). Piracy, according to Chalk, is a triad that includes an- chorage raids, at-sea thefts, and the seizure of ships and cargo with the goal of converting them into “phantom ships” for commerce or pirate mother ships. According to the Interna- tional Maritime Organization (2010), the term “piracy” is used loosely to describe assaults on ships, and it has therefore become the face of Africa’s maritime instability. Piracy continues to garner worldwide attention off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea, and even farther south.

According to the International Chamber of Shipping (2021), a continuing decline in So- mali piracy has led major shipping organizations to decrease the geographic limits of the ‘High Risk Area’ (HRA) for piracy in the Indian Ocean, which took effect on September 1, 2021. At the height of the Somali piracy danger in 2010, the HRA was established to warn shipowners, operators, and sailors where pirates were active and where additional attention was needed to prevent assaults. The HRA is criticized because the security environment is continuously changing, and when new security risks arise or intensify beyond the Indian Ocean, it has become apparent that the HRA is out of date and inaccurate. The HRA was critical during the height of the crisis in increasing awareness of the Somali pirate danger and the necessity for mitigating measures, but it has mostly fulfilled its function in safeguarding sailors and ships in the area. Now, the focus must turn to ensuring that all maritime security concerns across the world are addressed in order to continue to safeguard seafarers’ lives and keep global commerce flowing.

According to Davis et al. (2008), oil bunkering is most common in Nigerian seas and has national and international ramifications. At sea, pirate ships receive stolen petroleum from criminal syndicates and carry it farther afield, forming a maritime nexus. Armed organizations in the Niger delta, maritime tanker syndicates, and even corrupt naval/public authorities have a land–maritime relationship, indicating interfaced crime, political ambitions, and corrupt public authorities. Forest and Souza (2007) cite the 2003 MV African Pride incident in Lagos, in which the crew transferred the ship’s illicit oil cargo to a pirate tanker while under navy escort at sea. While oil bunkering is mostly criminal in nature, its close ties to broader oil politics in the Niger delta area and a poorly policed Gulf of Guinea bring it into the realm of bad maritime order.

West Africa, according to Ellis (2009), is a sanctuary for drug trafficking from South America to Europe. The Atlantic Ocean acts as a single transportation route with minimal opposition from West African law enforcement. Guinea Conakry, on the western coast of the Gulf of Guinea, provides a poorly policed maritime zone, enabling drug cartels (particularly from the Caribbean and South America) to easily transit from the sea into West Africa. He claims that the drug merchants are attracted to the area because of its geographic position and uncertain political environment, as well as a tolerance for smuggling operations. Cocaine from South America is transported to Europe through West Africa, while heroin from the Middle East is transported to the United States through West Africa. While Guinea Bissau seems to be the main point, a BBC article (2013) claims that it hides Nigerian participation in the drug movement in and out of West Africa. Weak maritime jurisdiction, combined with a similar landward weakness, facilitates drug trafficking from the sea into West African countries, and syndicates take advantage of this void to the fullest extent possible, with indications of a further link to the Tuaregs and even one suggesting al Qaeda in the Maghreb ties.

People who wish to escape Africa or who are compelled to do so by criminal syndicates, according to Le Sage (2010), must go by water, whether across the Mediterranean or the Red Sea in the Gulf of Aden. He claims that criminal syndicates in West Africa, North Africa, and East Africa are involved in human trafficking and transporting individuals anxious to exit the continent. Weapon smuggling is also a problem, according to the Brenthurst Foundation (2010), and it often contributes to fuel African violent conflicts. The big illicit weapons ship- ment discovered at the port of Lagos in 2010 attests to dubious or illicit weaponry transfers across African waterways, as well as an issue that the Nigerian and Iranian governments have yet to properly resolve. Pirates, poachers, armed terrorist groups, and governments subject to international arms restrictions all have a need for weapons, creating a market for illicit arms shipments via Africa’s poorly policed seas.

According to the Brenthurst Foundation (2010), there has been an increase in pollution along the coasts of West Africa and South Africa, as well as potential contamination in the major shipping lanes near the Horn of Africa. The terrorist assault on the MV Limburg, which spilled oil into the Red Sea, garbage dumping from the sea into the Ivory Coast’s interior, and highly toxic garbage found on the Somali coast are just a few instances of purposeful maritime pollution. Pollution is a hazard to the African waters, which are a source of food and an important element of the ecology, and it is also a transgression committed by rogue actors exploiting or sailing the seas and dwelling on the coastlines.

The issue impacts African communities, as well as their reliance on clean coastal waters and their right to live in a clean environment. Pollution, whether deliberate or not, is a per- sistent problem in African seas due to lax or non-existent enforcement. The Brenthurst Foun- dation Discussion Paper is rather specific regarding the pollution threat to Africa’s oceans’ safety and security, both for the seas and for their beneficiaries, implying dangers that extend well beyond the local coastal habitats.

The rising relevance of the sea to Africa’s economic and security prospects, according to Daniel (2005), is certain to call into question the existing status quo on maritime borders.

Unsettled maritime borders may become disputed as African emphasis shifts offshore, he adds. There has been a slew of maritime border disputes, ambiguous offshore demarcations, and tentative agreements between parties. In terms of maritime borders, West Africa has a notably unstable character, starting in the northwest with Morocco, Western Sahara, and Mauritania. The Gulf of Guinea and its littoral nations are the focus of continuing troubles farther south. Unsettled maritime borders in a recognized resource-rich offshore area may also be found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, and the Cabinda–Angola border.

Daniel adds that the maritime border between Namibia and South Africa seems to be tol- erated, but a low-level disagreement over gas, diamonds, and probably oil has the potential to escalate into a war. The maritime borders between South Africa, Mozambique, and Mada- gascar straddle freshly found gas reserves off the East coast, while Kenya and Somalia, further north, have yet to iron out their maritime border. The vast majority of these border disputes and agreements revolve around maritime resources, with oil and gas serving as catalysts for future interstate conflict.

According to Raidt and Smith (2010), the Gulf of Guinea is approximately defined by An- gola in the South, then continues North to Cameroon, then West across Nigeria to Liberia and Sierra Leone on its Western edge. It encompasses the 500 000 square mile Gulf of Guinea, which is rich in hydrocarbon reserves, fish populations, and commercial maritime operations, and is home to around 250 million people. Nigerian oil politics, according to Onuoha (2010), dominate maritime threats and vulnerabilities off the coast of West Africa, but the threat land- scape is more complex, and threats originate primarily from political volatility in coastal states, as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, the Congo Republic, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, for example, are known for their political turmoil.

Onuoha (2010) goes on to state that competition for oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea amongst major nations escalates the risk of military conflict as the United States, Europe, and Asia (particularly China) battle for energy resources. Big power rivalry generates client states, and equipping them to protect national interests suggests that the struggle is no longer only between multinational firms, but also between states. Onuoha adds that armed conflict is becoming more likely when state actors disguise energy security as a key national priority. Access to offshore oil and gas combined with the protection of energy security via military conflict, and the Gulf of Guinea as a potential oil center might boost militarization in the area, especially if maritime borders remain unresolved.

Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana have all got or will get new navy warships, and it’s no coincidence that these are nations with major offshore oil and gas reserves, as well as unresolved maritime borders (DefenceWeb, 2011). According to Raidt and Smith (2010), the lack of a genuine regional capacity to deal with threats to or from the offshore realm is especially critical. On land, there are huge militaries and police forces, but navy and other maritime capabilities, such as coastguards, are limited.

Conclusion

In the field of transnational threats against maritime security, there has been a shift toward international collaboration. While the emphasis on national sovereignty has persisted, coop- eration in the face of modern challenges has become essential. UNCLOS was established at a different period with the goal of combating maritime threats, but it only had little effective- ness. Maritime threats now occur all over the globe as a result of an increasingly globalized society and new technologies. Because of the global nature of these threats, no one country can effectively combat them. Economic considerations, as well as the particular interests of each state, will, of course, decide how far cooperation will go.

Furthermore, even if enough legal tools are given via bilateral or regional accords, not all governments have the financial means to act. They may not even be interested in preventing the smuggling of migrants or drugs from their shores, unless it is for political reasons. The answer seems to be more accountability on the part of more developed nations. Economic interests are considered to take precedence over accepting responsibility for human rights, which explains the increased collaboration when it comes to dangers to commerce, such as piracy and terrorism. It might be claimed that regional strategies are being created since bilateral agreements, which include procedures where authorization is assumed to be granted, are stated in a number of agreements in very similar ways. In certain areas of maritime security concerns, progress has been more effective than in others. However, it is clear that we are heading in the direction of more extensive international collaboration to fight transnational maritime dangers.

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